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Less is More: the problematic
future of irregular warfare in an era
of collapsing states
HY S ROTHSTEIN
ABSTRACT US success against irregular threats is inversely related to the
priority senior US officials (civilian and military) attach to the effort. When
one investigates the return on investment in the global war on terror (GWOT),
now increasingly described as the Long War, in Iraq versus in the Philippines, it
is clear that US efforts in the Philippines are achieving great success with
minimal resources, while efforts in Iraq are achieving limited success with
almost unlimited resources. The same is true of US success against an irregular
threat in El Salvador in the 1980s. During that period the focus of US military
attention was in Europe. El Salvador was a backwater that was never of
particularly great importance to the Pentagon. This paper will seek to
understand why limited efforts against irregular threats seem to result in greater
success than all-out efforts.
‘The smaller the unit the better its performance’: this statement, attributed to
TE Lawrence, is worthy of examination. It seems reasonable that a small
organisation would engender closer personal relationships than their larger
cousins. Personal relationships create a commitment among people and
differ significantly from faceless relationships. Consistent and visible
commitment tends to bring about reciprocal behaviour. This can generate
an atmosphere of trust that is arguably a necessary attribute for a high-
performance organisation. Trust relationships and commitment to team-
mates generate extraordinary results. Roger’s Rangers in North America in
1756 – 63, TE Lawrence in Arabia in 1916 – 18 and the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) in Burma in 1944 are a few examples where military units
achieved significant results that were disproportional to the units’ size. For
high-performance military units, the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts.
In contrast to TE Lawrence, Stalin is reported to have said of military force,
‘quantity has a quality all its own’. His meaning was clear; if you can’t
successfully compete qualitatively, compete quantitatively. Numbers, or sheer
mass, can make up for inferiorities in other important areas. Stalin was
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referring to Germany’s qualitative advantage in armaments over the USSR in
1939. This Soviet military formula was extended through the Cold War, with
Soviet numerical superiority in almost every facet of personnel and material.
Ironically, the USA’s historical qualitative advantage has not produced an
‘American way of war’ that is fundamentally different from the old Soviet
model. Russell Weigley’s classic work, The American Way of War, concluded
that, with the exception of the American Revolution, the American way of
war centred on achieving a crushing military victory.1 For the USSR and for
the USA, as long as the sum of the parts was sufficiently great, victory was
assured.
The differences between Lawrence’s small, qualitative approach to war and
Stalin’s large, quantitative approach are significant. In the abstract there is no
inherent virtue in one approach over the other. However, context can make
one approach more sensible than the other. There are circumstances where
overwhelming force is clearly inappropriate and there are circumstances
where a small, elite force is unlikely to achieve the desired political outcomes.
In fact, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. With each approach
positioned on opposite ends of a linear continuum, wars are, in reality,
prosecuted somewhere along the continuum between the two poles. At the
same time, if Weigley is correct, the USA is clearly positioned much closer to
quantitative end of the continuum and this position is maintained regardless
of context.
This quantitative preference tends to appear in the priority the USA places
on solving security issues. Specifically, a visible investment of significant
resources will be made to address an issue of considerable importance to the
USA. This investment signals the importance the USA places on that
particular issue. On the other hand, a small investment will identify a less
important issue. A problem arises when an issue is of considerable
importance to the USA but the situation is ill-suited to a quantitatively
oriented solution. One would think that it would be easy for a country like
the USA to throttle back and reduce the quantity of its response, but it is not
so simple. The American strategic culture is not so flexible. As a result,
irregular threats are handled quantitatively, based on the level of importance
or threat posed to US interests, even if a quantitative approach undermines
the accomplishment of strategic outcomes. Therefore it seems that, for
irregular threats, particularly those where local government legitimacy is in
question, US success is inversely related to the priority senior US officials
(civilian and military) attach to the effort. Only when the issue at stake is of
secondary importance can the US response result in a thoughtful, tailored
approach to a non-standard threat.
This article begins with a brief examination of the American way of war.
Second, it will review three cases where successful outcomes were dispro-
portional to the size of the military units employed. The three cases are: El
Salvador, 1980 – 94, the Philippines, 2001 – 05 and Afghanistan, October
2001 –February 2002. Finally, it concludes by identifying the circumstances
where ‘less is more’.
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The American way of war
The American way of war is a product of a long process of historical
socialisation that has achieved some degree of permanence and exhibits
distinct characteristics. This means that new policies, doctrines and
technologies will be shaped by these characteristics. Defence decisions will
be made within the context of this unique way of war. As a result, problems
may not be assessed objectively and solutions are likely to be anchored to old
ways of doing things that may not be relevant to all circumstances. Weigley
concludes that the objective of US military strategy has evolved to mean the
total destruction of the enemy, focusing on its armed forces but often
including the entire fabric of its society. Early American strategists such as
George Washington, Nathaniel Greene and Winfield Scott waged a more
restricted type of warfare as a result of limited resources and the general
belief of the times that moderated political aims.2 This changed during the
Civil War, when war became total in both its political aims and the resulting
carnage. General Robert E Lee’s offensively minded strategy sacrificed
thousands, while General Ulysses S Grant’s policy of annihilation was
regarded as butchery. Generals in blue and grey sought the climactic battle
whose outcome would end the war.
The grotesque scale of the blood-letting in World War I, coupled with
inconclusive results, led some US strategists to look for alternatives to land
warfare. Sea power and naval warfare offered a partial alternative but could
not replace the requirement to be prepared to fight where people live, on
land. Therefore, as World War II approached, US strategy was based on
massive mobilisation to build an army of almost 200 divisions and nine
million soldiers. Again, in Civil War style, US strategy was based on meeting
the enemy army on the battlefield and annihilating it. However, the
introduction of the aeroplane and Giulio Douhet’s ideas about air power
theory altered old conceptions about land warfare. Bombing the enemy and
its capacity to wage war could break the stalemates experienced in World
War I and bring hostilities to a speedy end. In other words, air power offered
the possibility of the ‘climactic battle’ and decisive victory that the Civil War
generals never found.3
The end of World War II ushered in the beginning of the Cold War. The
threat of nuclear war gave rise to the concept of ‘massive retaliation’. The
Cold War also increased the utility of old concepts of warfare such as
insurgency. The USA tried to duplicate its World War II success in Vietnam
using the same methods. The results are well known. It is probably premature
to attempt to characterise a strategic trend in the post-cold war period.
Operations in Iraq in 1991, the collapse of Yugoslavia, North Korea’s
aggressive behaviour or the humanitarian concerns and chaos produced by
failed states such as Haiti and Somalia imply a variety of threats, some old,
others new. Current political and military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
dominate the agenda of the USA’s decision makers but it is unclear whether
these ongoing efforts are episodic or a window into the future. Despite this
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dispersed shot pattern of threats and actions, the notion of warfare entering
the information age after the Cold War is unambiguous and almost uni-
versally accepted.
For many, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a testing ground for the
new warfare. This was especially true for both President Bush and Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld. Candidate Bush spoke about his vision of military
transformation that would rely on information technology and long-range,
precision strike weapons systems. Secretary Rumsfeld viewed military power
as increasingly defined by mobility and swiftness and not by mass or size. To
help transform the Department of Defense (DoD) to operate under this new
conception, Rumsfeld established the Office of Force Transformation in
October 2001. The Office’s first director was retired Admiral Arthur K
Cebrowski. He was the ideal man to implement the national command
authorities’ vision of future warfare, since it was Cebrowski, while on active
duty, who helped develop and publicise a distinct form of warfare called
network-centric warfare (NCW).4
NCW was the incarnation of what the President and Defense Secretary were
looking for. The concept exploits information superiority to generate
increased combat power by linking sensors and decision makers with
shooters to achieve greater lethality, survivability and battlefield synchroni-
sation. The proponents of NCW claim that it is revolutionary and
transformative and that it provides the USA with the potential to go beyond
annihilation to a strategy based on shock and awe. Shock and awe is a logical
by-product of NCW. Both concepts rely on near-perfect intelligence to deliver
long-range precision-guided munitions to destroy critical enemy systems and
infrastructure.5
However, any honest appraisal reveals that shock and awe is as closely
linked to Giulio Douhet’s ideas about the relevance of air power theory as it
is to a new way of war. Specifically, shock and awe rests on the belief that
inflicting high costs quickly and with precision can shatter morale and
undermine the basis for resistance. It rests on the projection of overwhelming
combat power. It also looks for the climactic battle whose outcome will end
the war, the battle that has eluded American generals since the Civil War.
Unfortunately, there is sufficient data to show that air power is neither a
‘magic bullet’ nor a way to win inexpensively.6
The nature of war also reflected the nature of American society. The USA
has always been a resource-rich country. As a consequence, the marshalling
of muscle in terms of manpower, equipment and industrial capacity has
always been of greater importance than the actual employment of force.
During both world wars Germany’s asset availability was grossly inferior to
that of its enemies. Germany lost both wars in large measure as a result of
material insufficiency. However, it is important to note that the German
Army outperformed its opponents by a significant degree. Victory, the result
of brute force and absolute quantity of available assets, exemplifies the
American way of war.7
Though accurate, the picture of the American way of war described so far
is incomplete. The USA does have a long history of fighting ‘small wars’. In
HY S ROTHSTEIN
278
fact, the US Marine Corps has a manual by this title that predates World
War II. The Barbary Wars, the Boxer Rebellion, US actions in Haiti,
Nicaragua and the Philippines, as well as more recent projections of
American power in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo, reflect this history.8
But, there are two features of both the USA’s ‘small wars’ and its ‘big wars’
that are troubling and limiting. Both reveal the USA’s military imperative for
quantitatively oriented solutions and both are more a way of battle than a
way of war, since they fall short of serious thinking about turning military
victory into successful policy outcomes.9
El Salvador: the strategic benefit of low priority
American involvement in the Salvadoran civil war was significantly shaped
by a failed policy in the aftermath of Vietnam. It marked a US effort to devise
an effective military strategy to deal with an irregular threat. Although US
support for El Salvador evoked occasional comparisons with the early stages
of that earlier conflict, it remained very different. The essence of the new
approach was to help a beleaguered ally with military, economic and
intelligence assistance, in addition to strategic and tactical advice, while
maintaining the principle that the war was theirs to either win or lose. This
principle precluded any consideration of committing US troops to combat.
More broadly, it restricted the human component of US assistance, both in
numbers and in the activities permitted by the few Americans that were
deployed to the war zone. However, one should not underestimate another
key reason for the restricted role of the US military in El Salvador—it simply
did not reflect the American way of war and therefore any serious support
would have been a diversion from more pressing military problems.10
Major support of the government of El Salvador began in the earliest days
of the Reagan Administration. In 1981 the deficiencies of the Salvadoran
government and its armed forces (ESAF) were so evident that a guerrilla
victory seemed likely. Operating in the open, the Faribundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) displayed a boldness and a level of competence that
repeatedly humiliated the Salvadoran armed forces. The initial thrust of the
US effort was aimed simply at preventing collapse. Working within the
constraints of a 55-man ceiling on US advisors, the USA subsidised a massive
expansion of the ESAF, quickly producing a larger, better equipped, more
proficient force. By 1985 the ESAF had frustrated enemy attempts to achieve a
decision and had deprived it of the initiative. The FMLN leadership was
forced to adopt a strategy of protracted warfare. At the same time, US
involvement in the Salvadoran war took shape without well defined
objectives, a comprehensive plan of action, or a clear appreciation of the
resources likely to be required. Simply put, an overarching strategic vision
was absent. As a result, Americans improvised, addressing problems in
isolation as they appeared.11
Some American advisors recognised that the solution to the Salvadoran
problem was not to be found strictly by military means. In fact, eventual
success resulted from engaging in the ‘other war’, which included
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programmes designed to establish local security, establish civil defence in the
villages, deliver civic action projects to the population, conduct psychological
warfare and promote social and economic reforms. It was clear that the
ESAF’s improved battlefield skills were necessary but insufficient as the
framework for the counterinsurgency strategy.
Counter-intuitively the successful outcome of US involvement in El
Salvador is directly tied to deficiencies in US military policy. The collective
mindset, priorities and organisation of the US government form the
backdrop against which the USA constructs its military policy. The US
foundation for conducting small wars was (and remains) defective. American
strategic culture has difficulty accepting the requirement to fight small wars
during what is presumably peacetime. Americans insist on defining war and
peace as distinct and mutually exclusive. Oddly, in El Salvador, these factors
contributed to the effectiveness of the US effort.
US deficiencies
Adhering to peacetime routines, officials in Washington failed to give the
Salvadoran problem sustained attention. Sensing the absence of a domestic
consensus in support for El Salvador, policy makers dodged the provisions of
the War Powers Resolution, thereby constraining the US soldiers charged
with advising and training the Salvadorans. Overlapping lines of civil and
military authority within the theatre often caused friction between the
ambassador and the responsible regional military commander, impeding co-
ordination. Perhaps most frustrating to those who served in El Salvador was
the cumbersome, unresponsive, intensely bureaucratised system of security
assistance that seemed to hamper US efforts to supply the ESAF with what
they needed.12
Deficiencies in US military doctrine, capabilities and personnel policies
further hindered efforts to assist the Salvadorans. Embittered by their defeat
in Vietnam, the military services practically abandoned teaching the subject
of insurgency. The army in particular embarked upon a process of doctrinal
renewal focusing on large-scale conventional warfare, the type of warfare
that was expected to be fought along the Fulda Gap in Germany against the
Soviets. This doctrinal renewal excluded addressing warfare at the other end
of the warfare spectrum. In effect, the army exorcised itself doctrinally of the
fundamental problems that irregular threats presented.13
The deliberate rejection of counterinsurgency in the aftermath of Vietnam
affected US involvement in El Salvador in other ways. For example, the
emphasis on ‘big wars’ eliminated any incentive for career-oriented, talented
soldiers to volunteer for service in El Salvador. Military personnel managers
would not send their most talented people to an assignment that was of
questionable value to the military service or the individual’s career
progression. Nevertheless, the long American involvement had made El
Salvador our war in a political sense. American prestige and military
effectiveness were on the line. To withdraw from El Salvador without credible
evidence of success would have diminished US credibility and damaged US
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interests. Nevertheless, military peacetime priorities remained more impor-
tant than US policy desires.
Military neglect leads to success
Senior military leaders often point to US success in El Salvador as if it was
the result of a deliberate plan that was executed with military precision. In
fact, some even called for the ‘Salvadoran Solution’ to reverse what appeared
to be troubling trends in Iraq in 2004. The belief that success in El Salvador
was the result of an engaged senior military cadre or that the ‘Salvadoran
Solution’ was exportable to Iraq reveals either ignorance or arrogance by
those who espouse these ideas. The deficiencies discussed above clearly reveal
the lack of importance senior US military officials placed on supporting the
Salvadoran government. Fortunately a succession of junior military advisors
with a fortuitous personal chemistry arrived on the scene in the initial stages
of US involvement. Only when this small cadre expanded and volunteered to
serve repeated tours of duty in El Salvador did US policy goals seem
attainable.14
Very often military units are actually ‘crippled’ rather than advantaged by
the assistance they get from higher headquarters. This tends to happen
during an important operation, when everyone wants to be involved and be
part of the action. The result of this ‘help’ is that the military organisation
responsible for mission execution spends more time interacting with higher
headquarters than preparing for the military operation. El Salvador is an
example where those closest to the action were inadvertently given sufficient
flexibility to plan and operate in the context of benign neglect. Specifically,
the focus of the senior US military brass remained fixed on Europe,
regardless of the rhetorical importance of Central America for the Reagan
administration.
During the height of US involvement in El Salvador, the above deficiencies
were viewed by many as impediments to achieving a quick and decisive
victory. In retrospect, these deficiencies created the possibility for a small
cadre of dedicated and knowledgeable Special Forces soldiers to achieve US
policy objectives. In Washington it seemed that the biggest concern regarding
military involvement was not to exceed the 55-man ceiling. Politicians also
demanded that military personnel function as trainers and not combat
advisors. Minimising military involvement in a communist-supported
insurgency helped ease any similarity with Vietnam. The effect of
Washington’s benign neglect was to enable a protracted effort in El Salvador,
which would not have been possible if thousands of US troops had been
deployed in a direct combat role.
The DoD’s doctrinal fixation on the Fulda Gap and rejection of counter-
insurgency as a necessary capability was also significant for the successful
political outcome in El Salvador. El Salvador was undergoing an insurgency
and therefore military involvement was of peripheral value to the services.
Simply put, the American way of war was ill-suited against an ideologically
oriented, non-state enemy. To see how this lack of priority helped the USA
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achieve its policy outcomes, one only needs to consider what would have
probably taken place if El Salvador was a high priority for the DoD.
First, military personnel managers would have rotated as many career-
oriented personnel as possible through one of the few combat venues available
at the time. This steady flow of changing faces would have made it extremely
difficult to develop a strategic coherence in US support. Furthermore, those
Special Forces personnel that had the training, education, experience and
orientation to properly respond to insurgency would doubtless have been
marginalised by the same organisation that wilfully excluded counter-
insurgency as a mission in the aftermath of Vietnam—the US Army.
Next, since duty in El Salvador would now be viewed as career enhancing,
it would attract ‘mainstream’ officers and NCOs. This mainstream group
would come with their own experiences, training, education and doctrinal
orientation. The fundamental differences between counterinsurgency and
conventional warfare would probably have become as irrelevant in El
Salvador as they were in Vietnam, perhaps precipitating the same results.
Finally, the flow of equipment and other material resources through the
advisors to the ESAF would have been greatly facilitated if military support to
El Salvador had been a priority. Increased logistics availability would have
confused material needs with ideological ends. Governments always have a
material advantage over insurgents. Therefore, improved logistics will only
create a marginal increase in advantage. Weigley’s view of the American way
of war, designed to deliver a crushing victory, requires superior logistics.
However, defeating an ideologically driven opponent calls for much more
than superior logistics. Access to a vast inventory of supplies would have
greatly reduced any serious efforts to develop a sound and sustainable
counterinsurgency strategy.
Although support for the besieged government of El Salvador was a
prominent feature of US foreign policy in the Reagan era, it remained a
distraction for the DoD. It was precisely for this reason that a dedicated
cadre consisting predominantly of Special Forces led perhaps the most
successful protracted effort to defeat an insurgency that was threatening an
ally in the Americas. This cadre, which operated almost without supervision,
developed a strategic coherence that was never evident in Washington, in the
US embassy or in the Regional Combatant Commander’s headquarters.
Had anyone in the DoD viewed US involvement in El Salvador as of central
value to the military, failure would have been snatched from the jaws of
victory.
The Philippines: mounting sustainable operations against insurgents
The US military was training the Philippine Armed Forces to more effectively
combat terrorism before terrorists attacked the USA on 11 September 2001.
In Manila and Washington the events of 9/11 only increased the awareness of
the threat and the need to intensify the effort. The Southern Philippines is
typical of areas that are ripe for insurgency. It is located along ethnic,
cultural and religious fault lines in a region that has been loosely controlled
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or governed throughout its long history of occupation. It is home to a
discontented Muslim population that has been dominated by a predomi-
nately Catholic government based in Manila. The Muslim population of
some five million people primarily resides in Mindanao and the Sulu
Archipelago, some of the poorest provinces of the Philippines.15
The area is famous, or infamous, for civil unrest, lawlessness, terrorist
activity and Muslim separatist movements. It is also home to several al-
Qaida-linked insurgent and terrorist organisations, which include the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and has also
been a safe haven for the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyya (JI). The core
leadership of many of these groups received their initial training in the camps
of Afghanistan and gained experience in the jihad against the Soviet invasion
during the 1980s. In fact, Osama bin-Laden’s brother-in-law provided the
ASG with its initial funding. While al-Qaida is not the cause of these
movements, it has used them as a vehicle to expand its global reach and
spread its extremist ideology.16 The USA became interested in the Southern
Philippines before 9/11, when the ASG kidnapped several US citizens and held
them hostage on their island stronghold of Basilan. After 9/11 the region
became a key piece in the GWOT when Washington and Manila set their
sights on the destruction of the ASG.
The indirect approach
Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, unilateral operations were not possible
within the borders of an allied state without its consent. In fact, the deploy-
ment of US forces inside the Philippines was a controversial issue. Many felt,
wrongly, that Philippine law prohibited the deployment of foreign troops on
Philippine soil. Politicians, exploiting the Philippine press, made the presence
of US troops so contentious that Washington would severely restrict the
deployment of its forces. US rules of engagement would prohibit troops from
initiating combat operations. If fact, US personnel could only use deadly
force to act in self-defence and in the defence of others. US freedom of action
would be severely restricted.17
The whirlwind of activities following 9/11 resulted in the US Pacific
Command’s (USPACOM) Special Operations Headquarters (SOCPAC) devel-
oping a training package designed to improve the Armed Forces of the
Philippine’s (AFP) ability to defend the country against terrorism. This plan
was based on assessments of AFP capabilities conducted by people with
considerable experience in the Philippines. The Philippine government
affirmed its commitment to combat terror when President Arroyo visited
Washington in November 2001 and met President Bush. The two leaders
declared their intentions to combat terror and protect Philippine sovereignty.
To this end, the US –Philippine agreement included a $100 million military
assistance package, $4.6 billion in economic aid, and the deployment to the
Philippines of US advisory teams. The Bush –Arroyo meeting established the
policy objective of defeating the terrorists in the Philippines by enhancing
local capabilities.18
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Another non-trivial aspect of the US effort was that the Philippines
remains an ‘economy of force’ theatre. The focus has been in Iraq first,
followed by Afghanistan. Military forces (army, navy, marine, air force and
special operations) were already committed, resulting in very few forces being
available for operations in the Philippines. There were other shortfalls. The
priority for combat-related equipment, supplies and ammunition was to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Very little was left to support operations in the Philippines.
The relatively low priority given to the Philippines in terms of resources was
compounded by the higher priority given to China and North Korea by
USPACOM.19
Logic, and a clear absence of any reasonable alternative, dictated an
indirect approach. USPACOM tasked SOCPAC with planning and executing the
‘GWOT Southeast Asian Campaign’. Based on an analysis of situation,
SOCPAC determined that the best way to proceed was to focus on the
following three interconnected activities:
1. Armed Forces of the Philippines Capacity Building—US military forces
train, advise and assist Philippine security forces to better create and
maintain a secure and stable environment.
2. Civil Military Operations—Government of the Philippines-led and US
facilitated humanitarian and civic action projects improve quality of life
and demonstrate the government’s concern for citizens.
3. Information Operations—Exploit the successes of the above two
activities in the minds of the people to enhance the government’s
legitimacy.20
The underlying principle in this strategy was that the expected value of
supporting the Philippine government must be made to be greater than the
expected value of supporting the terrorists.21
In February 2002 the USA dispatched a contingent of US troops to the
Philippines. The tip of the spear, 160 US Special Forces (SF) deployed onto
terrorist controlled Basilan. This force was later augmented with navy and
marine construction units to assist with civic action projects on the island.
The SF advisors lived and worked with their AFP counterparts who were
scattered around the island in remote areas located near ASG strongholds.
The AFP units on Basilan were unorganised, lacked training in basic infantry
skills and did not aggressively pursue the ASG.22
The SF teams developed close professional relationships based on mutual
trust with their AFP counterparts. Equally importantly, they also developed
rapport with the local villagers, using their language and cultural skills to
interact in routine activities. SF medics played a key role in establishing initial
trust among the population by providing medical assistance alongside the
AFP in remote villages. SF advisors also met key leaders, both military and
civilian, on their ground, to explain the rationale behind the Philippine
government –US effort, to dispel rumours and to manage expectations.
Simultaneously, the SF teams were increasing their own situational awareness
in order to facilitate tactical adjustments, measure effects and enhance force
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protection. Presence, perseverance and patience characterised the operating
philosophy.23
The most important task was to protect the local population by establishing
a secure environment. To do this, however, necessitated retraining the AFP to
increase unit proficiency and instill confidence. The SF teams immediately
went to work training Philippine soldiers and marines in basic combat skills.
Additionally, the government troops were trained to be able to give emer-
gency medical treatment in the field. This proved to be a significant morale
booster. This training was done in conjunction with converting the poorly
defended AFP base camps into tactically defensible areas. As unit proficiency
improved, security patrolling increased. Increased patrolling by competent
units led to seizing the initiative from the insurgents and establishing security
at the village level. SF teams played a key role in building AFP capacity by
accompanying units as advisors on combat operations.24 The establishment of
security and the protection of the local population provided the foundation
for all other activities designed to establish stability.25
Humanitarian assistance and civic action projects designed to meet the
basic needs of the local population began once security was established. As
the security situation improved, customised projects tailored to particular
regions and provinces followed. The Philippine government was in the lead,
with the USA providing support. When possible, locally procured materials
and workers were used on projects, in order to put money directly into the
local economy. These efforts increased the legitimacy of the government in
Manila and in the AFP, and helped restore law and order to the island. Most
importantly, the projects reduced Muslim village support for the terrorists on
Basilan, enabling the AFP to cultivate closer relations and strengthen their
control over the local population in insurgent-influenced areas.26
Stability and security on Basilan Island vastly improved from the days
when Abu Sayyaf gunmen staged kidnappings and killings that held the
entire island hostage. According to MindaNews, ‘Everyday, someone was
killed. The streets of Isabela became a battleground.’27 In 2001 alone a doctor
working on the island recorded 82 kidnappings, 32 deaths by gunshot
wounds and 19 beheadings.28 In 2003 the same doctor conducted only five
autopsies and there was not a single kidnapping or beheading. Insurgent and
extremist activity dropped dramatically. Today the majority of Christian and
Muslim citizens on the island no longer live in fear. Residents of Isabela,
Basilan’s capital city, now stroll the Plaza Rizal in the evening to hear live
music. Government officials say that the islanders now readily provide
information to thwart insurgent attacks. Businessmen have begun to invest
on the island. Finally, improved security conditions on Basilan have resulted
in the severing of ties with extremists.29
Eliminating the ASG as an imminent threat has also resulted in a 70%
reduction in military forces deployed on Basilan. Before US involvement in
2002 the government had seven infantry battalions deployed on Basilan
battling Abu Sayyaf and struggling to maintain law and order. Since 2003 the
AFP has needed just two US-trained infantry battalions on the island and has
transitioned many security-related responsibilities to local police and militia
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units. All this as a result of improved operational capability on the part of
AFP and an enhanced role on the part of the government in improving the
quality of life of the people of Basilan. These activities have permitted the
AFP to assume a more prominent role in peace and development, in contrast
with a past that emphasised force-on-force combat operations against the
terrorists or insurgents. Today Basilan Island is quite different from how it
was before 2002.30
The physical landscape of the island remains largely unchanged. The
rugged terrain and remote villages that extremists once found so inviting and
conducive to their deadly activities are all still there. What has changed is the
attitude and loyalties of the Basilan people, making the environment far less
conducive to insurgent or terrorist activity. While the ASG was not destroyed,
the Philippine –US effort has resulted in the following:
. denying insurgents and terrorists sanctuary on Basilan Island;
. improving the capacity of the armed forces of the Philippines;
. enhancing the legitimacy of the Philippine government in the region;
. establishing the conditions for peace and development on Basilan Island;
. providing a favourable impression of US military efforts in the region.31
Military strategy serving policy
The policy objective that emerged from the November 2001 Bush –Arroyo
meeting was clear. The GWOT in the Philippines required the USA to assist its
government in defeating the terrorists by developing and enhancing local
capabilities. The USA was restricted as to how US forces would prosecute
this portion of the GWOT in at least two ways. First, as a sovereign nation
and ally, the Philippine government limited the scope of US involvement.
Philippine politics would not permit the US presence to overwhelm
Philippine actions. Sensitive to Philippine domestic concerns, the USA also
restricted its involvement in going after terrorists. Second, the priority efforts
in the GWOT were in Iraq and Afghanistan. This meant that, in spite of the
overall importance of the GWOT, the Philippines was an ‘economy of force’
theatre. Manpower, equipment, supplies and high-level attention were visibly
absent. Counter-intuitively this opened the door to success.
There were significant advantages to the imposed restrictions and to not
being in the spotlight. Specifically, the American way of war, characterised
historically by the ability to marshal manpower, equipment and industrial
capacity, and more recently by NCW and ‘shock and awe’, did not have an
opportunity to materialise. The absence of these key features that the USA
counts on to wage war necessitated a different approach. The default strategy
that relies on sophisticated technology and material superiority, regardless of
the nature of the threat, was simply not an option. Fortunately for the USA,
SOCPAC clearly understood the operational environment, the need to engage
the threat discriminately and indirectly, and the imperative of ensuring the
legitimacy and credibility of the actions. The results of the Philippine –US
effort included: winning control of the countryside, alienating the insurgents
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sufficiently to significantly reduce recruits for the enemy’s cause, and
legitimising the operation, making it acceptable to the US population. This
plan resulted in anticipating and controlling events and producing the desired
policy outcomes.32
The successful strategy required a limited and indirect response. However,
the requirement for this type of response is no guarantee of getting one. One
cannot over-emphasise the happy coincidence of having a ‘right-minded’
chain of command in SOCPAC and a disengaged Pentagon and theatre
command. It is interesting to contemplate what the situation in the
Philippines would be like if the USA was not tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan
and if the Philippine government was willing to accept a larger direct role for
US forces. To start with, the ‘right-minded’ SOCPAC chain of command
would have been displaced. The renewed freedom of action, resulting from
manpower and material superiority coupled with governmental acceptance of
a larger and more direct US role, would doubtless have generated a strategy
similar to what has unfolded in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would be in spite
of natural constrains on freedom of action based on geography, politics,
culture, history, ethnicity and religion. It is likely that Basilan would have
become a magnet for jihadists.
Afghanistan: mid-September 2001 to December 2001
The effectiveness of US military operations in the days after 9/11 until the
collapse of the Taliban government was remarkable. A very small contingent
of extraordinarily capable men defeated an enemy army and ousted a
government. This achievement is particularly significant considering a large
part of the Soviet Army had been defeated on the same terrain by the same
people about 20 years earlier. The rapid, effective and efficient success of the
US military in the initial phase of the war in Afghanistan has been followed
by a build-up of more than 20 000 military personnel and a massive logistics
infrastructure. Unfortunately, the build-up of forces marked the beginning of
a less efficient, less effective operation and a countryside that has become less
secure with each day that passes. Why was such a small force quickly able to
accomplish so much, while a much larger force seems incapable of achieving
satisfactory outcomes?
In the days after the 9/11 attacks on the USA President Bush and his
Secretary of Defense aggressively sought a strong response against al-Qaida
and the Taliban, who had provided them with sanctuary. However, mounting
an appropriate response created a dilemma. Specifically, the typical slow
phase-by-phase model for the build-up of forces did not fit the reality on the
ground nor the political need to strike back quickly and effectively. An
‘absence of alternatives’ led to an unorthodox response that revolved around
the need for army Special Forces teams to satisfy the president’s and defence
secretary’s demands for action. But could SF produce fast results if they were
given every tool in the US arsenal?33
A few American and British special operations teams were on the ground
in Afghanistan conducting reconnaissance by early October 2001. The
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bombing campaign began on 7 October 2001, and focused initially on
destroying the Taliban’s limited air defence and communications systems. On
19 October 2001 two helicopters flew through blinding dust to deliver two US
SF teams to their landing zones deep inside Afghanistan. Local guides
appeared from the darkness to lead the Americans to the camp of one of the
major Northern Alliance warlords. The SF soldiers were to begin prepara-
tions for combined offensive action against the Taliban. More teams would
infiltrate in the days ahead and link up with other warlords, with the unified
purpose of ousting the Taliban.34
Some of the first major combat actions occurred in the mountains south of
Mazar-e-Sharif, as SF teams working with the Northern Alliance fought their
way north towards Mazar up the Dari-a-Souf and Dari-a-Balkh river valleys.
The terrain and conditions were extraordinary. Movement was restricted to
winding mountain trails that reached elevations of up to 6400 feet. Vertical
rock faces were sometimes separated from thousand-foot drops by only a
three-foot wide rocky path. Unable to use vehicles, mountain ponies with
wooden saddles were used to transport men and equipment through the high
mountain passes.35
Combat operations against the Taliban began quickly. Elements of the
Northern Alliance took the village of Bishqab on 21 October. This was
followed by engagements at Cobaki on 22 October, Chapchal on 23 October,
and Oimetan on 25 October. On 5 November Northern Alliance fighters,
under the command of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, encountered hostile
forces occupying old Soviet-built defensive positions at the hamlet of Bai
Beche, some 16 kilometres southeast of Keshendeh-ye Pa’in. Dostum’s
cavalry quickly overran these defences. Shortly thereafter, resistance forces
under the command of General Atta Mohammed captured Ac’capruk on the
Balkh River. These actions opened the door for a rapid advance to Mazar-e-
Sharif, which fell to Atta and Dostum’s forces on 10 November. All this
became possible thanks to the marriage of SF, with Afghan resistance forces
on the ground, and US air power. US air power, properly directed, was able
to keep constant pressure on the Taliban and decimate its military forces.36
The fall of Mazar, the second largest city in Afghanistan, broke the
Taliban grip on northern Afghanistan. Taliban defenders near Bamiyan
surrendered the city on 11 November without offering serious resistance.
Kabul fell without a fight on 13 November. In the city of Konduz, some 5000
Taliban and al-Qaida fighters were then encircled where they surrendered on
26 November following a 12-day siege. Cities were falling like dominoes.
Many of the prisoners were detained at the 19th century mud fortress of
Qala-i-Jangi west of the city. On 25 November a revolt at the prison killed
one American and gave rise to a two-day struggle before control was re-
established on 27 November.37
With northern Afghanistan no longer under control of the Taliban,
attention shifted to the south and to Kandahar, the spiritual home of the
Taliban. Two cities, Tarin Kowt and Sayd Slim Kalay had to be secured
before the assault on Kandahar. Hamid Karzai, the future president of
Afghanistan, advanced with his forces on the city from the north. In order to
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facilitate operations in Tarin Kowt, an SF team, Karzai and a few dozen of
his men were transported by MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to Tarin Kowt.
Karzai’s unexpected presence in the area so alarmed Taliban leaders in
Kandahar that they sent a 100-truck convoy and 1000 fighters to retake the
city. The convoy became bomb bait for the SF teams and the US Air Force.
On 17 November the SF team directed a flight of air force and navy jet
fighters against the approaching convoy. The convoy was bombed with
devastating results. However, the SF team had to abandon their observation
point in order to rally Karzai’s Pashtun fighters, who fled Tarin Kowt as the
large Taliban force approached. Nevertheless, US air power, expertly
directed, destroyed a significant portion of the Taliban convoy, prompting
the enemy to retreat to the south. Shortly after the taking of Tarin Kowt,
Karzai’s forces, again supported by SF, defeated another major Taliban force
at Sayd Slim Kalay on 4 December.38
As Karzai was negotiating with Mullah Naqib to peacefully surrender
Kandahar, Gul Agha Sherzai and his fighters captured the Taliban capital.
Sherzai, the provincial political leader in Kandahar before the Taliban,
reoccupied his former office on 7 December. Although, on the night of 6
December, Mullah Omar and the senior Taliban leadership fled the city and
went into hiding, every major Afghan city and town had been liberated from
Taliban control, ending their rule in Afghanistan.39
While the fall of Kandahar and Kabul marked the collapse of the Taliban
government and the disintegration of its fighting forces, it also marked the
end of the first and most successful phase of US efforts in Afghanistan. By
mid-November 2001 Central Command (CENTCOM) had more than 50 000
service members in its theatre of operations, half of which were aboard
ships in the Arabian Sea. Most of the remaining servicemen and women were
operating from support bases in Southwest Asia. On the ground in
Afghanistan the campaign to topple the Taliban had been orchestrated by
about 100 army Special Forces and a few air force special tactics controllers.
Given the initial disposition of the enemy in Afghanistan, SF did, in fact,
produce fast results using almost every tool in the US arsenal.40
The follow-on phases of the war were against a very different type of
enemy and the US response to the new threat was consistent with the
American way of war. It cannot be overstated that the plan for the first, and
highly successful, phase of the war resulted from the inability of the DoD to
execute a more robust and traditional option. In fact, the unorthodox plan
that was executed was developed by the CIA. The DoD options presented to
the president immediately after 9/11 were characterised by one senior DoD
official as ‘unimaginative’.41 However, once the Taliban and its convention-
ally disposed army were out of the way, DoD was able to gain traction and
quickly move towards implementing a plan consistent with American
warfighting culture. The 10th Mountain Division headquarters, along with
combat, combat support and combat service support elements, arrived at
Bagram Airbase to take charge of all operations inside Afghanistan.
Additional special operations units also arrived. Eventually, 18th Airborne
Corps, along with its own elements, arrived to take charge. The 100 army SF
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that took down the Taliban in a few weeks were replaced by almost 20 000
military personnel who would be responsible for completing the job.
Command and control (C2) in Afghanistan—big and bad (B2)
Martin van Creveld states that there are two alternatives for command and
control of military operations. One is to create staffs with enormous
information-processing capacity and the capability to manage subordinate
units with precision, the second is to design the organisation and divide the
task itself in such a way as to enable subordinate units to operate with less
information.42 The first alternative necessitates tight control by higher
headquarters of subordinate elements; the second necessitates loose control.
Van Creveld also tells us that a failure to adopt one of these two alternatives
will result in diminished combat performance.
Until the fall of the Taliban in December 2001 the second of the two
alternatives best describes the C2 process in Afghanistan. The commander of
the small SF contingent was in direct contact with General Tommy Franks,
the combatant commander. These SF elements had the most current and
accurate intelligence about the situation on the ground. It was impossible
for anyone in Washington or Tampa to have a better sense of what needed to
be done. Therefore, by accident more than by design, control was loose
and even the smallest SF elements were able to respond quickly to the
exigencies of the battlefield. In fact, perhaps the most remarkable feature of
this phase of the war was the absence of traditional command and control.
In early 2002 the C2 process changed. As soon as the DoD was able to set
up operations, command and control began to resemble the first alternative.
According to van Creveld, either alternative can produce acceptable results.
What actually developed was quite different from either alternative. It
appears that the military created what resembled van Creveld’s first
alternative. However, a dangerous and non-functional hybrid of both
alternative C2 options emerged. Higher headquarters seemed to understand
that the war had to be fought at the local level and that each town and
province had unique geographic, political and security issues. Accordingly,
bottom-driven operations became the expectation of both the 10th Mountain
Division and subsequently the 18th Airborne Corps. Higher headquarters
seemed to be moving towards Van Creveld’s second alternative C2 process.
At the same time, however, the 18th Airborne Corps adopted tight controls
that reflected the first C2 process. The result was a large, higher headquarters
that didn’t (and couldn’t) acquire or process the large amounts of infor-
mation needed to generate combat operations, and subordinate units without
the necessary authority to act in a timely manner to emerging situations. This
hybrid produced paralysis. It also generated operations based on intelligence
that was old and no longer valid.
A quick look at the US military in-country personnel strength figures helps
us understand why the military felt a need to adopt tight controls. Troop
strength steadily increased each month except in the December – January 2003
timeframe, which can be explained by a liberal Christmas holiday leave
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policy, and briefly in April –May 2003 during major combat operations in
Iraq. By June 2003 in-country troop strength had recovered and exceeded
pre-Iraq war numbers. The personnel strength figures shown in Table 1 were
obtained from the Directorate of Personnel at CENTCOM headquarters. More
recently, US troop strength in Afghanistan has been around 12 000 – 18 000.
When Combined Joint Task Force-Mountain (CJTF-Mountain was the
10th Mountain Division, augmented) commanded all operations in
Afghanistan, the task force operations centre would have a ‘huddle’ every
four hours to assess the situation since the previous huddle and to review
future activities. The ‘huddle’ routinely contained 70 people, most of whom
had something to say about ongoing operations. To be clear, the 70 people
represented only a fraction of the headquarters staff. This group of 70 seemed
to contribute more to the fog and friction of war than did the enemy. In June
2002 the 18th Airborne Corps took over control of the Afghanistan theatre
of operations, adding yet another layer of supervision. Now an SF
detachment’s request to conduct an operation could conceivably have to be
processed through six levels of command before being approved. One general
officer summed up the situation nicely: ‘too much overhead!’.43
Viable C2 was also affected by the fact that headquarters staff update
briefing slides were sent directly to the Secretary of Defense. At one staff
update the chief of staff of the 10th Mountain Division emphasised the
importance of consistency among the various staff sections so that the
Secretary would ‘get the right story’. One admiral stated that Secretary
Rumsfeld routinely required commanders to answer tactical questions. These
requirements often resulted from the staff update slides that were sent to the
secretary, but were also to help prepare him for his numerous media
presentations. This forced staffs at all levels to focus a considerable amount
of effort on providing information up the chain of command. Higher-level
staffs were able to cope with Washington’s insatiable appetite for
information. However, the distraction was non-trivial especially at the lower
levels, where large staffs were non-existent. Rather than facilitating
operations, higher staffs were placing demands on subordinate units to
answer trivial questions. This effectively undermined combat operations.44
Tight command and control paralysed initiative. Reports from members of
one SF Group in Afghanistan indicate that US forces must obtain approval
before conducting operations beyond six kilometres from their firebases.
TABLE 1. US service personnel in Afghanistan
January 2002 4024 October 2002 9427
Feburary 2002 4156 November 2002 9509
March 2002 5052 December 2002 9662
April 2002 6980 January 2003 9021
May 2002 7010 February 2003 9583
June 2002 7251 March 2003 9587
July 2002 7884 April 2003 9502
August 2002 8102 May 2003 9344
September 2002 9028 June 2003 9787
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Additionally, all ‘named’ operations (all those other than routine travel)
required approval from 18th Airborne Corps headquarters, which could take
up to 48 hours. SF in Afghanistan describe the 18th Airborne Corps planning
and approval process as ‘too slow and too large for all operations’ and state
that ‘the formal planning process demanded for all operations diminished
responsiveness to the point of inefficacy’.45 The net effect of these restrictions
was to impede the flexibility and response of SF, thereby surrendering the
initiative to local insurgents. The lack of responsiveness of US forces has
allowed insurgents to conduct operations unimpeded, thereby diminishing
security and control by the central government.
How could this happen?
How one organises can complicate or simplify combat effectiveness.
Organisation is a function of how a particular problem is diagnosed. A
faulty diagnosis will almost always lead to a poor operational plan. Yet the
organisation of a military force typically reflects the conceptual organisation
of the plan. In other words, not understanding the post-Taliban situation, yet
reflexively organising according to a traditional military model, created a
complex C2 arrangement incapable of conducting military operations suited
to the environment. The DoD’s organisational culture could only reproduce
an offspring that was compatible with its DNA.
Tight control of all military activities quickly became routine. Part of the
tight control resulted from the nature of modern operations, which requires
complex synchronisation of many actions. Part of the need for tight controls
also seemed to be a by-product of demands from Washington. The Secretary
of Defense continually sought tactical information. His requests became the
priority effort rather than focusing on combat operations.46 It is likely that
tight controls on combat operations had to be established to allow senior
commanders and staffs to keep pace with operations while answering the
Secretary’s queries. Also, the task force judge advocate general stated
that sensitive operations required the Secretary’s approval, although the
combatant commander, General Franks, could authorise an operation if
there was insufficient time to get Washington’s approval and the window of
opportunity to engage the target was closing. To an extent, tight controls
on operations were an inadvertent product of trying to create a common
operating picture of the battlefield from the foxhole to the Pentagon.
Conclusion: the problematic future of irregular warfare
in an era of collapsing states
While, by definition, irregular threats can differ significantly, the three cases
of success presented have several common features. The first conclusion is
that the proposition presented in the introduction, that US success against
irregular threats is inversely related to the priority senior US officials (civilian
and military) attach to the effort, is generally supported by the cases
presented. Although the Afghan case enjoyed complete and high-level
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support, senior officials were unable to meddle in the execution of the initial
phase of the fast-paced war. Therefore the first phase of the war resembled
the Salvadoran and Philippine cases to a significant degree. Second, irregular
threats seem to be better solved by developing capacity and legitimacy at the
lower levels. This represents an indirect route towards achieving policy
objectives. Bottom-up solutions, where US cadres are integrated with local
counterparts, produce measurable and, more importantly, durable results.
This strategy is more effective and efficient if initiated before a problem that
affects US interests or allies reaches critical mass. Third, the level of threat
must not have reached what Clausewitz referred to as the ‘culminating point’.
Specifically, the strength of the enemy should not significantly exceed the
strength of the friendly forces. I acknowledge that strength can and should be
a comprehensive measurement and not solely a military one. Additionally, I
acknowledge that it is also possible to succeed even if the culminating point
has been crossed, providing time and resources are not at issue. Fourth, a
cadre properly oriented to the task in terms of education, training, experience
and personal constitution is essential. Further, the special relationships
among cadre members should be based on trust. This is key because the
dynamic of the small group must be such that the whole is greater than the
sum of the parts. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, US leaders, civilian
and military, must care enough about policy outcomes to recognise
circumstances when doing less is really doing more.
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